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Introduction 
Professor Geralyn Miller reminds us of the range of voting administration practices 
across the United States.  We use this variability to study the average performance of various 
types of voting equipment throughout the country (Ansolabehere and Stewart, forthcoming).  
Professor Miller suggests that the performance of equipment is, in fact, quite variable across 
states.  A particular technology that performs poorly nationwide might perform well in a 
particular setting --- either because the technology is well suited to the peculiarities of the setting 
or because a locality has been proficient in overcoming shortcomings that vex other jurisdictions.  
In making this point, Professor Miller examines two states, Wyoming and Pennsylvania, in the 
2000 election. 
 
While we are sensitive to the general point Miller makes, her paper does not in fact 
demonstrate it.  Instead, careful consideration of this paper raises a separate, but equally 
important matter – the content and quality of local and state election reports.   The data she 
employs run up against problems that face all researchers doing this type of analysis.  Rather 
than mount a full-scale critique of Miller’s findings, we think it more constructive to focus on the 
two major data problems in her paper, as an illustration of precisely how hard it is to conduct this 
type of research.  The most serious errors in Miller’s paper are not readily apparent to most 
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researchers doing voting technology research.  Indeed, as we will show, Miller stumbled upon 
one error that we committed and were publicly chastised for. 
The two states that Miller studies illustrate separate and important data problems.  
Pennsylvania illustrates that states do not report all the data necessary to study the performance 
of voting technologies.  Wyoming illustrates that not all states report all they seem to be 
reporting.   
Beyond data collection concerns, there is also a basic issue of research design.  Single 
cross-sectional studies of individual states in fact have little statistical power.  The number of 
counties is simply too small to have arrive at meaningful estimates of average effects of 
technologies, let alone the interactive or varying effects of technologies used.   Research on 
election administration needs to go beyond looking at single elections in order to establish the 
point that voting technology performance varies across states.  That lesson is most clearly borne 
out in our prior research on this subject, in which many puzzling results emerge in cross-sections 
that are resolved in panel studies. 
Methodology Matters 
Important methodological issues arise in the study of voting technologies.  The first is 
that one must understand exactly how the data were generated.  We leave to the next sections 
consideration of the data reported by the states and counties in each of the two cases Professor 
Miller examines.  
Second, study of county-level data within a state quickly run up against the boundary of 
statistical power.   All estimates of machine type differences suggest that the difference in 
performance between the “best” and “worst” voting machines may be in the order of 1% of all 
ballots cast.  While this may seem like a small percentage, it represents a significant fraction of 
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the quadrennial variability in national turnout.  Any single factor that would increase or decrease 
turnout by one million voters nationwide, which is approximately 1% of turnout, would be 
noticed. 
In a single state with a small number of counties, a 1% difference is usually too small to 
be discerned with any degree of statistical power.  At the tradition level of p < .05, the standard 
error must be .005 for a 1% difference to be judged statistically significant in a t-test (to take the 
simplest example).  Yet, for such a small standard error to be achieved, the number of 
observations must be substantial.  Consider a simple example.  Technology A has a residual vote 
rate of 1.5% while Technology B has a residual vote rate of 2.5%.  In both sets of counties, the 
standard deviation of the residual vote rate is 2%.  Assume the simplest case, where we have an 
equal number of observations on counties with Technology A and Technology B.  How large 
does the sample need to be, in order to produce a standard error of .005?  The answer is 
approximately 1,600.  That is significantly larger than the number of counties in Wyoming (23) 
or Pennsylvania (67).   In the case of Wyoming, the differences between the different voting 
technologies in a single year would have to be scandalous beyond belief to survive a statistical 
test with such a small number of observations. 
To overcome the small-n problem, researchers have resorted to a number of strategies.  
The first is simply to increase the number of observations.  Miller’s use of precinct data is clearly 
an attempt to do this.  Unfortunately, as we note later, the precinct data she used did not include 
the write-in vote for Nader.  This leads to bias in the estimates; increasing sample size will not 
resolve this bias.  Regression analyses across precincts offers some help to the extent that the 
control variables correct the particular source of bias.   Regression models can also improve 
precision, since the control variables capture variation in the dependent variable.  Unfortunately, 
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the demographic or political controls that might be included in a regression are rarely if ever 
reported at the precinct level. 
A better strategy for getting at state (or national) differences requires less data than 
precinct data --- create a panel.  In other words, the spirit of Miller’s article can be maintained by 
including residual vote rates from all Wyoming counties across a number of years.  If the time 
period of the panel is short enough to allow us to assume that the county-level independent 
variables that influence residual votes (other than voting machines used in year t) are constant, 
then we can employ fixed effects regression.  Under fixed effects regression, the omitted 
independent variables are accounted for with a series of dummy variables, one for each county 
(in this case).  In addition, because there is year-to-year variability in aggregate residual vote 
rates, we include a dummy variable for each election year.  Finally, the test for voting machine 
effects is conducted with a series of dummy variables, equal to 1 if county c used a particular 
machine in election year t, 0 otherwise. 
Table 1 reports the analysis of a fixed effects regression of Wyoming, using the data we 
previously gathered, or purchased from Election Data Services, Inc.1  Like Miller, we excluded 
Big Horn County, because it used a mix of equipment.  We also weighted each observation by 
turnout, so that the results could be interpreted in terms of the probability that an individual voter 
would cast a residual vote. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The three dummy variables for years simply allow residual vote rates to vary by year, 
most likely because the percentage of intentional abstentions fluctuates because of differences in 
                                                 
1 Election Data Services, Inc. (EDS) is a primary provider of data on election administration; see 
http://www.electiondataservices.com/home.htm. 
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candidates and campaign intensity.  Here, we see that the residual vote rates in 1992, 1996, and 
2000 were between 2.2% and 3.9% lower than they were in 1988.   
The dummy variables for machine type use punch cards as the omitted category, since it 
was the most commonly used voting machine in Wyoming during this period.  Keep in mind that 
most counties changed their voting technology type at some point during this period:  only seven 
of the 22 counties included in this analysis used in the same voting technology in 2000 that they 
used in 1988.  Therefore, the dummy variables for voting technology type are leveraging off two 
types of information:  differences in residual vote rates across machine types in any given year 
and differences in residual vote rates across time in counties that changed machine type during 
this period. 
The voting technology dummy variable coefficients are all negative, indicating that lever 
machines, optical scanners, and DREs all averaged lower residual vote rates than punch cards.  
The optical scan and DRE differences are statistically significant, and at 1.9%, are substantively 
important.  In 2000, 28,276 Wyomingites cast their ballots using punch cards.  If those voters 
had been allowed to vote on optical scanners or DREs, these results suggest that 537 more votes 
would have been recorded for president in Wyoming, simply by virtue of upgrades to voting 
technology. 
In the analysis we have conducted in other papers, we have used fixed effects regression 
to estimate differences across voting machine types nationwide (Ansolabehere and Stewart, 
forthcoming).  In these regressions, based on over ten thousand observations, we are able to 
include other controls, such as state dummies, to account for differences in administrative 
practices across states, and turnout, to account for differences when large numbers of voters 
unexpectedly surge into the electorate.  Because of the large number of observations, the results 
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we get in those analyses are much more precise.  However, they are substantively different from 
what we get when we analyze Wyoming alone.  For instance, in Ansolabehere and Stewart 
(forthcoming, Table 3), we find optical scanners to have residual vote rates 1.3% less than punch 
cards and DREs to have residual vote rates 0.6% less than punch cards.  The Wyoming 
differences appear to be larger in magnitude and slightly different in substance.  However, all 
these analyses share one thread:  punch cards are the worst, nationwide and in Wyoming. 
Researchers must be very cautious about basic questions of statistical power when they 
study elections and voting technology, or indeed when they use any county-level data within a 
single state.  An equally fundamental issue, though, concerns the quality of the data employed in 
a given study.   Understanding of the problem with Professor Miller’s analysis emerges upon 
careful consideration of the two states under study.   
Pennsylvania:  States don’t always report what we need 
In our research, we examined voting technology performance nationwide from 1988 to 
2000 at the county-level (Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, July 2001).  We immediately 
discovered that many states do not require their counties to report all the data necessary to 
conduct basic research into voting technology performance.  As we document in our recent 
recommendations to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), there are at least eleven states 
that fit into that category (Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project October 2004).   This is a 
major problem for auditing and inspecting elections in these states, as even the most rough and 
ready measures of performance, residual votes, cannot be computed.   
Without a statewide certification of turnout, many problems and inconsistencies in the 
data reported in a state might arise.  In states where no statewide certification of turnout is made, 
counties have considerable discretion in deciding what to report for total ballots cast.  Sometimes 
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counties make a complete report of total ballots cast.  However, we also discovered in our data 
collection efforts that, if there is no official certification, counties sometimes report the election 
night tally (which may not even include all precincts), the total ballots cast in precincts (which 
does not include absentees), or nothing at all. 2   
Pennsylvania is one of the eleven states that have no statewide turnout certification.  It is 
also one of two cases Professor Miller has chosen to study.  In our data collection efforts in 2001, 
we were able to track down information on turnout from five Pennsylvania counties (of 67) --- 
Beaver, Cambria, Chester, Lehigh, and Washington. Some of these counties were of particular 
interest because of the technologies used.  However, because of questions about the certification 
process, we left this state out of the overall data analysis.  Pennsylvania itself consisted of only a 
small fraction of the sample.  Our entire panel data set amounted to 13,000 observations, 
consisting of county-level election returns from 1988 to 2000.  The data do include states similar 
to Pennsylvania in many respects, such as New York, Ohio, and Indiana.  For the purposes of 
estimating nationwide voting technology performance, the Pennsylvania data were not 
necessary; nor did we have much confidence in what we were able to collect. 
Miller made a more concerted effort gathering data from Pennsylvania.  She contacted 
each county in Pennsylvania and obtained the number of total ballots cast that each reported.  
She deleted three counties that could not produce total ballots cast, and six counties that reported 
                                                 
2 Following the 2002 election, we employed a team of research assistants to gather election and machine 
data, to follow up on our previous research.  A significant fraction of the team’s time was spent contacting local 
officials in Pennsylvania and other states that did not certify total ballots cast.  Many of these offices could not 
provide information requested and were frequently hostile toward the students and faculty making the request. 
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using a mixture of voting systems for precinct voting.  She provided us with her data, which we 
use here (and below) to explore some implications of her arguments. 
We begin with a simple attempt at replication. 
The first step in the replication was to look at the data.   The most striking thing about the 
data set is that three counties --- Dauphin, Mercer, and Philadelphia --- had negative residual 
vote rates in the presidential race.  That is, they had more votes recorded for president than they 
had voters recorded as voting. 
We checked the presidential vote data in Miller’s dataset against that provided online by 
the Pennsylvania Department of State. Unfortunately, this did not clarify the matter much.3  In 
two cases (Dauhpin and Mercer Counties), the Department of State website actually reported an 
even greater number of ballots counted in the presidential race, thus making the residual vote 
even more negative.  In the case of Philadelphia County, Miller reports 563,339 presidential 
votes counted, while the Department of State website reports 561,180 --- but both of these 
numbers are still greater than the number of reported total ballots cast used by Miller (560,179).   
Why do such discrepancies occur?  In our experience, they arise from many different 
sources – failure to include absentee ballots, use of preliminary vote tallies to get information out 
to the media, and typographical errors in state or county reports.  In states that do not have 
statewide certification of total ballots cast, there are often large discrepancies across counties in 
what is reported, as each county uses a different standard to establish turnout.   
In one respect these sorts of errors may not be catastrophic.  If the underlying residual 
vote rate is highly correlated with the observed rate calculated, regressions and differences of 
                                                 
3 http://web.dos.state.pa.us/cgi-bin/ElectionResults/county2.cgi?eyear=2000&etype=G&office=USP 
accessed on Sept. 9, 2004. 
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means may still capture the effects of technology.   Nonetheless, in our research, we have 
dropped counties with negative residual vote rates. 
The second step in the replication was to reconstruct Table I in Miller’s paper, which 
reports the correlation coefficients between voting technology type and residual vote for 
president and senator (measured as a percentage of the vote).  We were unable to do so.  (See 
Table 2.)  The reason is simple:  Miller uses the wrong total turnout figure for Bucks County.  In 
an original data set provided to us by Professor Miller, the turnout figure for Bucks County was 
erroneously reported to be 564,471.  When our problems replicating Table 1 were brought to 
Professor Miller’s attention, she informed us that the correct turnout figure for Buck County was 
264,471.  However, she apparently never re-calculated the presidential and senatorial residual 
vote rates using the corrected Bucks County figure.  In other words, Table I in the Miller paper 
can only be replicated if we use the original, incorrect, number for turnout in Bucks County.  As 
far as we can tell, the results in Table I are due to a typographical error. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Using the corrected turnout figure for Buck County turnout, we were similarly unable to 
replicate Table II, which reported regression results predicting residual vote rates for senator and 
president. 
Wyoming:  Errors and Omissions 
Miller’s second case is Wyoming.  Wyoming state law requires counties to report 
turnout, in addition to vote counts.  On the face of it, Wyoming appears to be an exemplary case 
of how state officials can report the data necessary for their citizens, and others, to judge the 
performance of their election technologies.  Immediately after the 2000 election, the Wyoming 
Secretary of State posted precise information about the voting systems used by each county, the 
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total number of ballots cast in each county, and the votes received by each candidate on the 
ballot.4  Based on the available information, our July 2001 report listed Wyoming with a 3.6% 
residual vote in the 2000 presidential election, the second highest among the states we had data 
for, behind Illinois. 
Shortly after our July 2001 report was published, communications between the Wyoming 
Secretary of State and our university presidents ensued, with the Wyoming officials claiming that 
our analysis of their state’s residual vote rates was flawed.  In the exchange that ensued, the 
source of the problem became evident.   
Ralph Nader was not on the Wyoming ballot, but he received a significant write-in vote.  
Under Wyoming law, the votes of write-in candidates are included in the statewide canvass only 
if they affect the outcome of the election.5  Therefore, Nader’s vote appears to be part of the 
residual vote in the Wyoming web site.  However, because Nader had formally requested that 
Wyoming record his write-in votes, the Elections Division had gathered this information from 
the county election directors.  It was available for anyone who asked, but you had to know to 
ask.  Because we did not know to ask, we didn’t.  We assumed that the certification of the vote 
was of all votes cast. 
                                                 
4 It appears that Wyoming added even more detailed information about election returns to their web site, 
after our data gathering sweep in early 2001.  Of particular note is the precinct-level data that Miller uses in her 
paper.  According to the technical information about the web content on that site, the precinct data were added on 
February 5, 2001.  Our initial gathering of county-level information occurred on January 18, 2001. 
5 Wyoming Statute, 22-16-103; personal correspondence with Peggy Nighswonger, Wyoming Election 
Director, 7 August 2001. 
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After re-examination, we issued an errata for our 2001 report, in which we noted that 
“The residual vote rate listed for the state of Wyoming for the year 2000 should be 1.5,” 
acknowledging that the write-in votes in the 2000 presidential race were substantial enough to 
influence our residual vote estimates.6 
This omission (which appears to be unique among the states) is critical for judging the 
relative performance of voting technologies in Wyoming.7   Variability in the Nader vote in 
Wyoming in 2000 is correlated with the type of voting technology used. Counties that had a high 
write-in vote for Nader were significantly more likely to use optical scanners than those with few 
Nader votes.  (See Table 3.)  Consequently, this had the effect of making it seem like optical 
scanners performed less well in Wyoming in 2000 than in the rest of the nation, and that optical 
scanning performed less well in Wyoming than other technologies.  In fact, when we correct for 
the Nader vote in the various counties, the relative performance of optical scanners (and lever 
machines), compared to other equipment, is also consistent with the nationwide trends we have 
reported.   
[Table 3 about here] 
To be clear about this:  Miller utilizes precinct-level data from Wyoming that is precisely 
the data we originally used, which omitted the Nader vote.  Precinct level data can be very 
valuable in this sort of analysis; in this case, it is valuable only if it includes the Nader write-in 
votes in each precinct.  It does not.  Therefore, Miller’s conclusions are not valid. 
                                                 
6 See http://vote.caltech.edu/Reports/2001report.html 
7 Wyoming announced in September 2004 that it would publicly report write-in votes for president in 2004.  
See Thomas Hargrove, “Wyoming Agrees to Change Election Reporting,” Scripps Howard News Service, 
September 16, 2004, accessed via LexisNexis. 
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In fact, if Miller had the precinct data corrected for the Nader vote, it would follow 
almost precisely the results in Table 3.  That is because the right way to measure differences in 
residual vote rates across voting technologies is to weight each observation (whether precinct or 
county) by turnout.  In cases where all the precincts in a county use the same technology, it does 
not matter whether we aggregate up from the precinct or county level --- the weighted averages 
will be identical.  In the case of Wyoming, there is one county that used two methods of voting; 
knowing which precinct used which method allows for some differences in the two different 
aggregation methods.  In the case of Wyoming, however, the difference is trivial. 
Conclusions 
Understanding the performance of voting technologies in the United States using 
scientific methods is a critical part of the policy process that tries to improve voting in America.  
Previous research we have conducted has helped shape national and state policy in technology 
upgrades.  Professor Miller suggests that each state may in fact deviate from the national 
average, and that some technologies might be most appropriate for particular states.   Punch 
cards might work well in Pennsylvania; optical scanning might work poorly in Wyoming.    
We have analyzed the data presented in Professor Miller’s article, and conclude that the 
data in fact support our findings concerning the weaknesses of punch cards overall and the 
comparatively good performance of scanners.  In Wyoming, using the correct accounting of 
presidential ballots cast, optical scanning performs much better than punch cards or electronics.   
The figures are remarkably close to the national pattern.   In Pennsylvania, because the state does 
not provide for a certification of the total ballots cast, the appropriate data for the assessment of 
voting technology do not appear to be available, even after Professor Miller’s considerable 
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efforts to collect the appropriate data. Some counties show negative residual votes, which are 
logically impossible.   
The more general lesson we draw from our research, though, is that there are significant 
data challenges in the field of election administration and election studies.   As we have noted in 
two recent reports (Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project July 2004, October 2004) there is a 
disturbing lack of detailed election administration data available for studying elections.  In past 
elections, some states have not reported the number of total ballots cast at the county level, 
others have not fully reported votes cast for all candidates (including write-in votes) in federal 
races, and in many situations we do not know what types of voting technologies have been used 
by voters.  The situation is even more problematic when it comes to other aspects of the electoral 
process, as we rarely can find data on very important aspects of the process like the numbers of 
absentee and provisional ballots cast, and the numbers of absentee and provisional ballots 
rejected.   
More needs to be done to help state and local election officials understand the importance 
of collecting and making election data available to the public after each federal election.  In 
particular, election officials should collect and distribute (at the lowest level of aggregation 
possible): 
1. The total number of registered voters who cast ballots in the jurisdiction 
2. The total number of votes cast for every federal candidate on the ballot, including all 
votes cast for write-in candidates 
3. The numbers of absentee, early, and provisional ballots distributed, and the numbers of 
these included in official vote tabulations 
4. The technologies utilized for precinct, early and absentee voting 
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5. Documentation about all incidents and problems that arose regarding voting equipment 
and administrative issues, including the steps taken to resolve these problems. 
Provision of these data (and other more detailed data when possible) would help the 
public and policymakers understand the elections process in better detail and help to insure the 
integrity of future elections. 
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Table 1.  Fixed effects regression predicting residual vote in Wyoming presidential elections, 
1988-2000. 
 
Year effects (1988 comparison 
category): 
 
  Year=1992 -0.039 
(0.004) 
  Year=1996 -0.022 
(0.006) 
  Year=2000 -0.025 
(0.007) 
Voting technology effects (punch 
cards comparison category) 
 
  Lever machines -0.010 
(0.011) 
  Optical scanners -0.019 
(0.007) 
  DRE -0.019 
(0.009) 
Constant 0.057 
(0.004) 
  
N 88 
R2 .72 
F-test for 22 county dummy 
variables (coefficients suppressed) 
(d.f.=22,63) 
1.03 
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Table 2.  Correlation coefficients for Pennsylvania Equipment and Residual Votes:  Replication 
of Miller Table I. 
 
 
Office  
 
Paper 
Lever 
Machines 
Punch 
Cards 
Optical 
Scan 
 
DRE 
U.S. Senate Miller -.038 .383 -.120 -.242 -.047 
 Replication -.035 .278 -.089 -.167 -.042 
U.S. President Miller -.043 .199 -.051 -.159 .040 
 Replication -.037 .193 -.057 -.129 -.000 
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Table 3.  Residual vote rate and Nader vote, by type of voting technology used in Wyoming, 
2000 presidential election. 
 
 
Nader pct. 
Residual vote rate 
w/out Nader vote 
Residual vote rate 
with Nader vote 
DRE 0.8 2.8 2.0 
Lever machine 0.6 1.9 1.3 
Mixed 0.9 3.3 2.4 
Punch card 0.7 3.2 2.5 
Optical scan 2.4 3.8 1.3 
Total 2.1 3.6 1.5 
 
